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Transforming the Balkans? Lesson Learning and Institutional 
 Ref lexivity in the EU Enlargement Approach
MÁIRE BRANIFF*
Abstract. European Union (EU) enlargement has important implications for the political 
and economic transition for the candidate and ‘potential’ candidate states of the Western 
Balkans. Similarly, the enlargement approach has effects on the functionality of EU enlarge-
ment. The article explores the development of the relationships between the EU and the 
Balkans and the politics and functionality of EU enlargement approach. The article examines 
how through a process of lesson learning and institutional refl exivity the development of the 
EU enlargement approach has impacted the technical and political basis and operation of 
the EU enlargement approach. This has evolved because of the interplay of factors, which 
includes institutional refl exivity within and among key agencies. Consequently, the EU has 
signifi cantly extended political conditionality, the timeframe for accession, and the mecha-
nisms for enlargement. Hence, the article concludes that EU enlargement has conformed to 
the policy-learning model with consequences for the enlargement to the Balkans.
I Introduction
The European Union’s (EU’s) history of enlargement has been credited with 
extending peace, prosperity, and security across Europe and as a normative, self-
refl exive power; such EU agencies are undoubtedly impacted by previous experi-
ences. Accordingly:
Past enlargements have generally been a great success, benefi ting the old as well 
as the new EU Member States by fostering economic growth, promoting social 
progress and bringing peace, stability, freedom and prosperity to the  European 
continent; believes that lessons can be learned from previous accessions and 
that further ways of improving the quality of the enlargement process must be 
based on the positive experiences accumulated so far.1
 * Dr Máire Braniff, University of Ulster, <m.braniff@ulster.ac.uk>. This article has greatly ben-
efi ted from comments from Prof. Guelke and Dr Phinnemore at Queen’s University, Belfast, and 
anonymous reviewers and from discussions at the Symposium ‘The Republic of Macedonia and the 
Western Balkans’, Centre for European Studies, University of Limerick, March 2008.
 1 European Parliament, ‘Report on the Commission’s 2007 enlargement strategy paper 
(2007/2271(INI))’, Committee on Foreign Affairs (26 Jun. 2008), pt 1.
European Foreign Affairs Review 14: 547–563, 2009. 
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The ‘lessons learned’ have led to an innovative policy adaptation and incremen-
tal change in how the EU enlargement approach works, such as the employment of 
benchmarks, the pressure to achieve progress earlier in the pre-accession process, 
balancing carrots and sticks, and policy fl exibility. Such analysis suggests that 
the EU has refi ned and adapted its existing mechanisms as well as developed new 
ones as a result of the experiential lesson learning in the countries of the former 
Yugoslavia and ongoing enlargements, hence moving from existing narratives of a 
reactive and a path-dependent actor. A path-dependent EU enlargement approach 
obscures the implicit and essential political judgments involved in lesson learning 
that effect policy-making. At the centre of the implementation of the enlargement 
approach are the Directorate General (DG) Enlargement, responsible for monitor-
ing, advising, and preparing future Member States for accession and at the same 
time being very much aware of the impacts, intended and unintended, of their 
approach both in future Member States and within the EU.
The inbuilt ambitions of democratization, confl ict transformation, stabilization, 
and Member State building embodied within the EU’s enlargement approach are 
not necessarily compatible, and as a result, institutional learning within the EU 
enlargement approach has affected its operation and implementation. The various 
strategies of stabilizing, democratizing, Member State building, and transform-
ing confl ict have at times been contradictory and have challenged the realization 
of any of these objectives. There is a tension between and within each of these 
ambitions and a tension between the capacity of the EU to export EU norms and 
practices in Western Balkans and the potential side effect of reaction, reproduc-
tion, or causing of confl ict. According to Karcaska, the situation on the ground 
in the Western Balkans with unresolved security and constitutional issues forced 
the EU to provide a framework for association as well as being a direct negotiator 
in drawing up constitutions and constitutional arrangements.2 Although the situ-
ation on the ground has certainly provided the EU with a set of challenges which 
it is forced to respond, it is the manner of the response which is of interest in this 
article. A possible solution to the limitations lies with the EU’s capacity to institu-
tionalize and implement lessons gained from experiential learning moving from a 
path-dependent actor involved in regurgitation of tried and tested policies. Accord-
ing to Jervis, ‘we cannot make sense out of our environment without assuming 
that, in some sense, the future will resemble the past’.3 Thus, while the existing EU 
toolbox remains, the selectivity over policy-making is impacted by experiential 
lesson learning, thus the policy changes.
 2 S. Karcaska, ‘Extension of EU Conditionality in the Western Balkans – The Case of the Repub-
lic of Macedonia’, Working Paper, Presented at Symposium ‘The Republic of Macedonia and the 
Western Balkans’, Centre for European Studies (University of Limerick, March 2008).
 3 R. Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1976).
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Enlargement is not easy to direct in Europe; aside from it being a political and 
legal process, sentiments and concerns held by the European public will, through 
democratic representative politics, fi nd their way into the enlargement process. 
Enlargement fatigue was the leitmotif in Summer 2005 in the aftermath of the 
rejection in the Constitutional Treaty in France and The Netherlands. The chang-
ing context within the EU, as opposed to policy-learning or refl exivity, affected the 
mode of the enlargement approach in the Balkans. The Commission confronted 
‘enlargement fatigue’ in November 2005 Commission Strategy Papers on enlarge-
ment and the January 2006 Communication to the Western Balkans. According to 
the European Commission, the EU aims to carry out a ‘carefully managed enlarge-
ment process’ that will address the EU public’s ‘legitimate concerns’; this suggests 
a weakening of opinion to the EU.4 This new situation within the enlargement 
process was characterized by the intensifi cation of the use of conditionality and 
monitoring along with the introduction of benchmarks. Additionally, the avis for 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Croatia was much more explicit 
than for previous candidate states.5
As a strategy for confl ict resolution and a mechanism for change, the EU relied 
upon its existing toolbox when it offered the Western Balkans the prospect of 
membership and a framework for closer integration into the EU.6 Although the 
suitability of this strategy was questionable from the outset, it becomes pertinent 
to investigate refl exivity in action in the policy-making process. It is possible to 
argue that changes in policy implementation and direction result purely from les-
son learning and carefully considered changes in policy implementation; in other 
words, it could amount to a simple case of institutional improvization.7 Is it a case 
of responding to evolving political dynamics in the aspirant Member State, being 
event-led policy-makers, or sitting back, patiently relying on the power of attrac-
tion of membership taken from the existing toolbox? It is debatable as to what 
the EU’s intentions in the Western Balkans are, does the EU have a plan or is the 
EU’s strategy just wishful thinking pursued through an ad hoc series of responses? 
Is their strategy simply to hope for more conducive domestic political situations 
in which their ambitions to stabilize and integrate the countries transpire? Or, is 
it a strategy based upon fl exible trial/error exercises and programmes through an 
incremental learning process?
 4 European Commission, 2005 Enlargement Strategy Paper, COM(2005) 561 fi nal, Brussels, 
9 Nov. 2005.
 5 The EU formally uses the name Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in its publications 
and language.
 6 L. Friis & A. Murphy, ‘Turbo-Charged Negotiations: The EU and the Stability Pact for South 
Eastern Europe’, Journal of European Public Policy 7, no. 5 special issue (2000): 767–786; and id., 
‘Negotiating in a Time of Crisis: The EU’s Response to the Military Confl ict in Kosovo’, EU Work-
ing papers, European University Institute, RSC No. 20 (2000).
 7 E. Pond, ‘Serbia’s Choice’, Survival 51, no. 2 (2009): 123–126 and 132.
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It is of interest here that the EU is learning lessons from internal EU policy as 
opposed to other institutional actors such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the 
United Nations, and the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe. Within 
the EU enlargement approach, lessons learned have been from policy evaluations 
and reappraisals of the enlargement policy. Nonetheless, the EU enlargement policy 
does not face similar scrutiny and monitoring experienced by Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) policies and missions which previous studies about institu-
tional refl exivity.8 For example, the Policy Unit produces monitoring and evaluation 
reports on CFSP activities such as Mission Reports and Lessons Identifi ed/Lessons 
Learned Reports. Since this is not commonly in place in the enlargement process, 
where rigorous monitoring focuses on candidate and pre-candidate countries, the 
task of identifying lessons learned is much more challenging. This compounds the 
diffi culty to learn, institutionalize, and implement lessons. Additionally, it has been 
diffi cult for the EU to coordinate the lessons that the various agencies of the EU have 
learned. Nevertheless, a useful methodological tool for assessing lessons learned is 
the Enlargement Strategy Reports published by DG Enlargement.
The article, fi rstly, refl ects on institutional refl exivity and considers the rele-
vance to learning within the enlargement approach. The increasingly salient role 
that political conditionality plays in the enlargement process as well as the intro-
duction of new mechanisms including benchmarks represent an indication that the 
agencies involved in the enlargement approach are refl exive and innovative. This 
refl exive enlargement approach has the implications of the evolved conditionality 
for two countries in the accession process considered here: Croatia and Serbia.
II The Lesson Learning Process
Institutional refl exivity deals with how both organizations and individuals learn 
usually referred to as social learning. Hall defi ned:
Social learning as a deliberate attempt to adjust the goals or techniques of policy 
in response to past experience and new information. Learning is indicated when 
policy changes as the result of such a process.9
Consequently, learning facilitates institutions, such as DG Enlargement to rec-
tify fl aws in the policy process or alleviate unintended effects stemming from 
 8 S. Duke, ‘Linchpin COPS: Assessing the Workings and Institutional Relations of the Political 
and Security Committee’, <http://aei.pitt.edu/5914/>, EIPA Working Paper 2005/W/05; S. Duke & 
S. Vanhoonacker, ‘Administrative Governance in CFSP: Development Practice’, EFA Rev. 11, no. 
2 (2006): 163–182; K. Glarbo, ‘Wide-Awake Diplomacy: Reconstructing the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy of the European Union’, Journal of European Public Policy 6, no. 4 (1999): 634–
651; and A.I. Johnston, ‘Treating International Institutions as Social Environments’, International 
Studies Quarterly 45 (2001): 487–515.
 9 P.A. Hall, ‘Policy-Paradigms, Social Learning and the State: The Case of Economic Policy-
making in Britain’, Comparative Politics 25, no 3 (1993): 275–296.
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 policy implementation. This builds on the accepted hypothesis that learning occurs 
more often from failure than from success. Aguilar pointed out:
Few lessons are learned when the outcome is successful, given that nobody 
ever inquires into whether this outcome has really been achieved as a result of 
a political decision, or whether on the contrary, it has been achieved in spite of 
that decision.10
Although faith in the transformative capacity of the enlargement approach 
remained stalwart, the mechanisms of enlargement evolved, opening the debate 
about how institutional lesson learning has impacted the development of the 
enlargement approach as a means of transforming aspiring Member States into 
Member States.11
According to Ernst Haas, international institutional learning and refl exivity is:
A shorthand way to say that the actors representing states and members of the 
secretariat, working together in the organization in the search for solutions to 
problems on the agenda, have agreed on a new way of conceptualizing the 
problems.12
Conceptualizing problems and searching for solutions to the problems is a pro-
cess of change.13 In other words, refl exivity takes into account the impact of the 
policy outcomes and integrates lessons into a changed policy. The lesson learning 
capacity of the EU relates explicitly and directly to the EU’s institutional refl ex-
ivity. However, this lesson learning capacity surely is predicated on the various 
EU agencies behaving rationally. Therefore, refl exive behaviour ‘springs from an 
ongoing refl ection about the action, its context, its effects on such a context and the 
feedback of those expected effects on the action’.14 For the EU’s lesson learning 
to have an impact on its transformative capacity, lessons must be institutional-
ized and implemented in changed policy. These changes may be incremental and 
innovative various EU agencies and Member States means that learning is much 
 10 P. Aguilar, Memory and Amnesia: The Role of the Spanish Civil War in the Transition to 
Democracy (New York: Berghahn Books, 2002).
 11 H. Grabbe, The EU’s Transformative Power: Europeanization through Conditionality in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe (London: MacMillan, 2006); C. Pippan, ‘The Rocky Road to Europe: The 
EU’s Stabilization and Association Process for the Western Balkans and the Principle of Condi-
tionality’, EFA Rev. 9, no. 2 (2004): 230; D. Spence, ‘The Evolving Role of Foreign Ministries in 
the Conduct of European Union Affairs’, in Foreign Ministries in the European Union. Integrating 
Diplomats, ed. B. Hocking & D. Spence (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002).
 12 E.B. Haas, When Knowledge is Power (Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 
1990), 26.
 13 J.G. March, ‘Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning’, Organization Science 
2 (1991): 71–87.
 14 F. Bicchi, ‘Our Size Fits All: Normative Power Europe and the Mediterranean’, Journal of 
European Public Policy 13, no. 2 (2005): 286–303.
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more diffi cult to assess. Potentially, problems of internal communication and 
cross-agency communication as well as institutional memory and behaviour can 
limit lesson learning that can promote policy change. Likewise, a lack of resources 
will inhibit the lesson learning process.15 Moreover, rational learners can learn the 
‘wrong’ lessons.16 Ultimately, as Nye argued, ‘shifts in social structure and politi-
cal power determine whose learning matters’.17 Hence, institutional learning is 
dictated by the intellectual, technical, and political processes interacting within EU 
agencies, which shape EU policy outputs. Therefore, policy outputs are affected 
by the balance of power among and within EU agencies and indeed the memory 
of past enlargements. Accordingly, learning is shaped ‘less by history than by the 
frames applied to that history’.18
Institutional learning very much depends upon the capacity of individuals 
within those institutions to draw upon and incorporate learning into their work 
life. According to Juncos and Pormorska, Brussels staff are not ‘structural idiots’ 
purely impacted by the social and normative structures of the institution but rather 
they are ‘self-refl ective and reactive’.19 Adding to this, Aguilar pointed out that 
‘those who take political decisions tend to place excessive emphasis on the les-
sons which derive from their own personal experience and undervalue the lessons 
which derive from the experience of others’.20 This refl exivity extends to explain-
ing the way that the enlargement process adapts and changes. Narrative suggests 
that external pressures drive the enlargement approach and changing events, which 
obscured the internal policy-making decisions, which were affected, by experien-
tial learning and refl exivity. In sum: organizational learning involves a multi-stage 
process in which environmental feedback leads to individual learning, which leads 
to individual action to change organizational procedures, which leads to a change 
in organizational behaviour, which leads to further feedback.
The European Commission has alluded to the benefi ts of a refl exive approach: 
‘Every enlargement must be followed by adequate consolidation and political con-
centration, that is to say, by a serious reassessment of the Union’s policies and 
means in order to respond to the expectations of European citizens and to guaran-
tee the viability of the Union as a political project.’21 Additionally, the Commis-
sion advocated wholesale institutional learning explicitly: ‘The EU has taken steps 
 15 D.A. Levinthal & J.G. March, ‘The Myopia of Learning’, Strategic Management Journal 14 
(1993): 95–112.
 16 See Hall, supra n. 9.
 17 J.S. Nye, ‘Nuclear Learning and US-Soviet Security Regimes’, International Organization 41, 
no. 3 (1987): 371–402 at 381.
 18 See Levinthal & March, supra n. 15.
 19 A. Juncos & K. Pomorska, ‘Playing the Brussels Game: Strategic Socialization in the CFSP 
Council Working Groups’, European Integration Online Papers 10 (2006).
 20 See Aguilar, supra n. 10.
 21 Committee on Foreign Affairs, ‘Report on the Commission’s 2007 Enlargement Strategy Paper 
(2007/2271(INI))’ (26 Jun. 2008), pt 1.
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to improve the quality of the enlargement process, considering in particular the 
lessons learned from previous enlargements. Greater focus is now given at an early 
stage to the rule of law and good governance.’22
Accepting this lens, in what ways does institutional refl exivity explain the deci-
sions made and processes of political conditionality in the EU enlargement pro-
cess? Because the EU claims to learn lessons – Is this an accurate refl ection of a 
lesson learning process? As an evolving process within a dynamic EU, the EU 
enlargement approach is very much a result of the EU dealing with new challenges 
posed by extending its boundaries, as well as a degree of institutional refl exivity 
and reactivity that has engendered the refi nement and broadening of the enlarge-
ment approach. The article takes its impetus from the idea that as mechanism for 
encouraging and monitoring change in aspiring EU Member States, political con-
ditionality has evolved and become gradually more relevant to the enlargement 
process. Such advancement and salience facilitates analysis of the triggers for the 
changing nature and role of political conditionality as an instrument of European-
ization in the enlargement process.
III The EU Enlargement Approach in the Western Balkans
The EU enlargement approach is set out in various EU treaties and Commis-
sion Reports on Enlargement. It is in these documents and in the functioning of the 
enlargement approach that we can trace the refl exivity and evolution of the enlarge-
ment approach through the institution of membership criteria through to the refi ne-
ment and expansion of mechanisms used in the enlargement process. Fundamental 
treaty reform made advancement in an enlargement approach possible. The treaties 
of the EU, namely, the Treaty of Rome (1957), the Single European Act (1987), the 
Treaty of Maastricht (1992), the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), and the Treaty of Nice 
(2000) have all asserted and preserved the open door nature of the EU. Although the 
Treaty of Rome was substantially concerned with matters for its own Member States, 
it established a future scope for enlargement to other states. Each of these treaties pro-
gressively advanced the criteria for EU membership, whereas the defi nition of what 
makes a ‘European’ state remained open. Throughout the process of widening the EU, 
political conditionality has increased in its salience in preparing aspirants to become 
Member States. Although membership criteria were present in previous enlargements, 
its application became more rigorously applied with the institution of the Copenha-
gen Criteria as a legally binding framework and a political priority.23 The Copenhagen 
European Council in 1993 stated that membership of the EU was based on:
 22 European Commission, ‘Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2008–2009’, COM(2008) 
674 fi nal (Brussels, 5 Nov. 2008).
 23 D. Kochenov, ‘Behind the Copenhagen Façade. The Meaning and Structure of the Copenha-
gen Political Criterion of Democracy and the Rule of Law’, European Integration Online Papers 8 
(2004), <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-010a.htm>.
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Stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights 
and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market 
economy, as well as the ability to cope with competitive pressures and  market 
forces within the Union, the ability to take on the obligations of membership, 
including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.24
Moreover, Article 49 of the Treaty on EU as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam 
stated: ‘Any European state which respects the principles set out in Article 6 (1) 
may apply to become a member of the Union.’25
Therefore, the basis of the European treaties permits any European state that 
meets the membership criteria to join the EU with the additional caveat that the 
institutional, fi nancial, and political stability of the EU should not be threatened 
by the admission of new Member States: ‘The Union’s capacity to absorb new 
members, while maintaining the momentum of European integration, is also an 
important consideration in the general interest of both the Union and the candidate 
countries.’26
As with any state aspiring to join the EU, the countries of the Western Balkans 
must meet the EU’s legal, economic, and political conditions, and be ready to 
assume the responsibilities of membership. The Copenhagen Criteria formed the 
basis of a conditionality that has since evolved, particularly in political terms. For 
the countries of the Western Balkans, political conditionality has been extended 
signifi cantly including additional conditions specifi ed in the Regional Approach, 
the Stabilization and Association process (SAP) conditionality. Institutional refl ex-
ivity within key EU agencies explains the changing nature and role of political 
conditionality in the enlargement process.
Regarding the Western Balkans, political conditionality has been a feature of 
relationships with the EU. Even when in the late 1990s, the EU introduced the 
Regional Approach for the Western Balkans, political conditionality focused on 
encouraging reforms in the political area, such as returns of refugees and inter-
ethnic reconciliation.27 The Regional approach, however, failed to provide the 
prospect of membership as the major incentive of conditionality, and did not 
deliver tangible results. However, at the cornerstone of all future relations with 
the Western Balkans lay conditionality buoyed by the potential to achieve mem-
bership. Relations with the Western Balkan countries were a unique mix of stabi-
lization, democratization, and accession through conditionality and socialization 
instruments. Indeed, the EU expanded beyond the traditional scope of political 
 conditionality experienced the countries of the 2004 and 2007 enlargements owing 
 24 European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen, 21–22 Jun. 1993, pt 7, A. iii.
 25 Article 6(1) of the Treaty on European Union as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam stated that 
‘The Union Is Founded on the Principles of Liberty, Democracy, Respect for Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms, and the Rule of Law, Principles Which Are Common to the Member States.’
 26 European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen, 21–22 Jun. 1993, pt 7. A. iii.
 27 General Affairs Council Conclusions, Luxembourg, PRES/97/129, April 2007.
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to the ascertained need to deal with the legacies stemming from the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Political conditionality functioned in several different 
ways ranging from state building, democratization, and confl ict transformation to 
the more traditional and technical matters of harmonization with the acquis.
As events evolved and context changed in the former Yugoslavia during the 
1990s, the refl exivity and fl exibility of the EC/EU to adapt their policies and 
approaches specifi cally to what was happening in the countries of the former 
Yugoslavia was evident in the strategic policy planning and programme develop-
ment to deal specifi cally with Montenegro and Kosovo. In the mid-1990s, the EU 
developed policies and mechanisms, which Montenegro and Kosovo could access 
without interference from the central political authority in Belgrade. In terms 
of the mechanisms and self-confi dence, the EC/EU developed mechanisms in 
response to experiences and lessons learned from their engagement in  Yugoslavia. 
EU policy was a mix of incremental and innovative learning: while the Royau-
mont Process and the Regional Approach (based on an idea previously discussed 
by Greek Defence Minister Arsenis) demonstrated that this was both incremental 
and innovative policy change in that it was the evolution of a new idea leading to 
a changed policy. Furthermore, evidence existed in February 1997 that explained 
that the EU was a refl exive actor that had implications for its policy development 
and transformative capacity. Obviously, changing events in the Balkans mattered. 
After the EU carried out a fact-fi nding mission in February 1997 to Belgrade and 
as result of lessons learned about the situation in Belgrade and the effects of their 
existing approach decided to change their approach to Belgrade and ‘apply con-
ditionality gradually with the view to developing a coherent strategy for relations 
with the countries of the region’.28 Although the shift was made possible by the 
change in circumstance, the policy utilized was an existing policy – conditionality 
and integration. However, academic discourse debates this policy change as Peter-
son points out, sustaining the policy-learning model, in times of crisis, ‘almost 
instinctively, the EU becomes highly conservative and tends to fall back on some 
type of past policy, even if it is clearly no longer appropriate’.29
After the war in Kosovo, policy change as a result of refl exivity resulted in 
the Stabilization and Association process and the offer of the membership per-
spective. The external shock of the war in Kosovo stimulated EU policy change 
which had important consequences for the future transformative capacity of the 
EU, namely, the change in enlargement strategy to include the countries of the 
former  Yugoslavia and how EU leaders perceived the link between security and 
enlargement.30 Additionally, the external shock of the war in Kosovo provided a 
 learning experience for the EU. During the war in Kosovo, the EU was  preparing 
 28 Agence Europe, 25 Feb. 1997.
 29 J. Peterson & H. Sjursen, A Common Foreign Policy for Europe (London: Routledge, 1993), 13.
 30 A. Higashino, ‘For the Sake of “Peace and Security”? The Role of Security in the European 
Union Enlargement Eastwards’, Cooperation and Confl ict 39, no. 4 (2004): 361.
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for what was to come after the war was over and how they would stabilize the 
region. Therefore, the EU policy-makers were making a conscious effort to 
improve their policies and approaches to the countries of the former Yugoslavia 
in 1999–2000. This argument is sustained by consideration of the insistence of 
Fischer and the German Presidency that something radical had to be done since the 
existing EU approach was obviously not working.31 The Fischer Plan developed in 
to the  Stability Pact, which came about due to the war in Kosovo, the failures of 
the Rambouillet Conference, and the bombing of Serbia. According to Pippan,32 
the intention of the Fischer Plan may have been to offer an accelerated acces-
sion  process yet this would have ‘resulted in a discrimination of the [Central and 
Eastern European Countries] … thus, in an inconsistent application of Article 49 
[Treaty on European Union]’.
In 2003, the countries of the Western Balkans became part of the Stabiliza-
tion and Association process that from its title indicates that it is not purely about 
association but includes an added extra of stabilization. This is particular to the 
EU’s strategy with the countries of the Western Balkans.33 Conditionality in the 
Stabilization and Association Agreements was an evolution of an earlier form of 
association agreement, the Europe Agreements. Distinctiveness from the Europe 
Agreements lies in the Stabilization and Association Agreements, adding a con-
dition of regional cooperation which was an explicit condition that must be met 
and which is found only in the Stabilization and Association Agreements.34 Also, 
while the Stabilization and Association Agreements did not include an explicit 
membership framework and, in the Agreements, the associates were named as 
‘potential candidates’, the EU had ‘integrated the principle of conditionality into 
the Stabilization and Association Agreements’.35 Essentially, Croatia and Serbia, 
as candidate and potential candidate states who have negotiated or are negotiating 
a Stabilization and Association Agreement, are subject to conditionality.
Conditionality is a multi-level phenomenon. Firstly, there are the accession cri-
teria as established by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993 and set out in 
Articles 6 and 49 of the EU Treaty. Secondly, there are the set of criteria that are 
specifi c to the Stabilization and Association process that includes ‘full cooperation 
with the ICTY, respect for human and minority rights, the creation of real opportu-
nities for refugees and internally displaced persons to return and a visible commit-
ment to regional cooperation’.36 Extending the Copenhagen and Madrid Criteria, 
the Stabilization and Association Agreements required that the associates met the 
 31 Pippan, supra n. 11, 226–228.
 32 Ibid., 228.
 33 D. Phinnemore, ‘Stabilization and Association Agreements: Europe Agreements for the  Western 
Balkans?’, EFA Rev. 8, no. 1(2003): 77–103.
 34 Ibid., 86.
 35 Pippan, supra n. 11, 230.
 36 Council Conclusions of 29 Apr. 1997, Bulletin EU 4-1997, pt 2.2.1.
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following conditions: ‘Respect for democratic principles, human rights and the 
rule of law; the establishment of a free trade area with the EU; and the achieve-
ment of rights and obligations, in areas such as competition and state aid rules, that 
allow the economies to integrate with the EU.’37
The conclusion of Stabilization and Association Agreement negotiations takes 
place when the specifi c conditions are deemed adequately met, usually based on a 
judgment by the Commission’s annual monitoring. If the Commission deems the 
country to be fully meeting the Stabilization and Association Agreement condi-
tionality, the European Council then makes a decision, only when ratifi ed by the 
European Parliament, to conclude the Stabilization and Association Agreement.
Following this, the path is clear for a membership application and the opening 
of accession negotiations. This too continues to be conditional on the continued 
implementation of the Stabilization and Association Agreement. The Stabilization 
and Association Agreement signed with Croatia stated the following:
If either party considers that the other Party has failed to fulfi l an obligation 
under this Agreement, it may take appropriate measures. Before doing so, 
 except in cases of special urgency, it shall supply the Stabilization and Associa-
tion Council with all relevant information required for a thorough examination 
of the situation with a view to seeking a solution acceptable to the parties.38
In other words, the progress of the Stabilization and Association Agreement 
would depend upon the continued implementation of the agreed terms. In addition 
to the Stabilization and Association Agreements, at the Thessaloniki summit in 
June 2003, the EU introduced the common instruments for EU accession, such as 
the European partnerships and the Progress Reports for the Western Balkans.
EU conditionality in the Western Balkans is qualitatively different to that expe-
rienced in previous enlargements; the EU instrumentalized and  operationalized 
lessons learned from previous engagements and enlargements. Foremost, politi-
cal conditionality is not purely being applied to the acquis, but rather confronts 
issues outstanding from the wars, therefore moves into the scope of confl ict 
transformation. Additionally, the evolving conditionality of the accession pro-
cess is evident in the employment of benchmarks. According to the Commission, 
benchmarks are a ‘new tool introduced as a result of lessons learnt from the fi fth 
enlargement’.39 Benchmarks are linked directly to the acquis: the opening of 
negotiations includes taking preparatory steps such as action plans and fulfi lling 
the contractual  obligations of the acquis, and the closing of benchmarks involves 
 37 European Commission, The Stabilisation and Association Process for South East Europe: First 
Annual Report, COM(2002) 163 fi nal, Brussels, 3 Apr. 2002.
 38 European Commission, ‘Stabilisation and Association Agreement Croatia’, COM(2001) 371 
fi nal, Brussels, 9 Jul. 2001, Art. 120.
 39 European Commission, ‘2006 Enlargement Strategy Paper’, COM(2006) 649 fi nal, Brussels, 
8 Nov. 2006.
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the implementation of the acquis. A unanimous Council decision, on proposal 
from the  Commission, is responsible for confi rming that conditions had been 
met and opening chapters. This means that, at an earlier stage in negotiations, 
the EU will monitor more closely and expect more from candidates than was the 
case in previous enlargements. For Croatia, a candidate that is also part of the 
Stabilization and Association process, relevant benchmarks for opening chapters 
in accession negotiations also depend upon the fulfi lment of commitments under 
the Stabilization and Association Agreement.40 The implications for the Western 
Balkan countries are double-edged: it is much more diffi cult to become a mem-
ber of the EU; it will produce a better-prepared candidate. Pippan noted that the 
introduction of benchmarks into the pre-accession process was inadequate and 
advocated that:
Clearer benchmarks are needed, defi ning as precisely as possible the steps to be 
taken by each country in order to move to the next stage of the SAP [Stabiliza-
tion and Association Process]. Indeed if the SAP [Stabilization and Association 
Process] is viewed as the ‘road to Europe’ for the Western Balkans, the coun-
tries concerned have to be provided with an appropriately detailed road map 
guiding them to their desired destination.41
Tension between the demands of democracy, accountability, communica-
tion, and policy effi cacy forced the hand of the Commission in its management 
of enlargement. The need to continue implementation and monitoring to portray 
reliability and maintain attractiveness while dealing with the mounting enlarge-
ment-sceptic voices within the EU resulted in a measured approach to enlargement 
post-2004. Acting in response to the pressures about enlargement, the Commission 
specifi ed in the October 2004 and November 2005 Commission Strategy Papers 
on enlargement and the January 2006 Communication to the Western Balkans 
the changing enlargement dynamics. These documents consistently reiterated the 
European destiny of the countries of the Western Balkans but indicated a tighten-
ing conditionality and lengthening the timeframe for Western Balkans enlarge-
ment. The European Commission reached the following conclusions that refl ect 
the malaise and disenchantment with the future of the enlargement project: ‘an 
institutional settlement should have been reached by the time the next new mem-
ber is likely to be ready to join the Union’ and that ‘integration capacity – can the 
EU take in new members without jeopardizing the political and policy objectives 
established by the Treaties? – is achieved’.42 In the aftermath of the rejection of 
the Constitutional Treaty and the resultant backlash over enlargement fatigue, the 
Commission was forced to defi ne when future enlargement would be possible and 
 40 European Commission, ‘2005 Enlargement Strategy Paper’, COM(2005) 561 fi nal, Brussels, 
9 Nov. 2005.
 41 Pippan, supra n. 11.
 42 European Commission, ‘2006 Enlargement Strategy Paper’, COM(2006) 649 fi nal, Brussels, 
8 Nov. 2006.
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clarify what exactly was meant by the ever-elusive term ‘integration capacity’. 
Accordingly, the Commission defi ned integration capacity as:
(1) accession states should contribute to and not impair the ability of the 
Union to maintain momentum towards the fulfi lment of its political 
objectives;
(2) the institutional framework of the Union should be able to deliver effi cient 
and effective government;
(3) the fi nancial resources of the Union should be adequate to meet the chal-
lenges of social and economic cohesion and of the Union’s common poli-
cies; and
(4) a comprehensive communication strategy should be in place to inform 
public opinion about the implications of enlargement.43
Despite of the evolving EU conditionality, membership for the Western Balkans 
ultimately retained its attractiveness, attraction undoubtedly ebbing at times. The 
malleability of the attractiveness of EU membership makes possible and underpins 
institutional lesson learning.
Although the events of 2005 forced the hand of the Commission to respond to the 
Parliament’s concerns about the enlargement approach and in particular ‘integra-
tion capacity’, the policy change that took place was ultimately self-refl exive and a 
result from institutional learning. The introduction of benchmarking, more staging 
posts, and more complicated steps refl ects the institutional refl exivity within DG 
Enlargement and other EU agencies such as the Parliament and Council. The con-
siderable experiences of enlarging in 2004 and 2007 provided opportunities for the 
EU to learn how to avoid repeating mistakes and side step comparable pitfalls in 
the Balkans. This marks institutional learning, a departure from path-dependency 
and also the development of a much more tailored approach for the post-war cir-
cumstances. Path-dependency explained a specifi c European policy-making style, 
yet as Christiansen pointed out the maturing Commission’s emerging role is predi-
cated on its ‘ability for organizational learning and the development of administra-
tive practices that are adaptable to different contexts’.44
IV Assessing Impact: Delaying Tactics or Better-Prepared Candidates?
According to the European Commission:
Building on the EU’s existing strategy, the present communication analyses the 
key challenges on the road towards EU integration. It outlines an approach to 
 43 European Commission, ‘Enlargement Strategy and the Main Challenges 2007–2008’, 
COM(2007) 663 fi nal, Brussels, 6 Nov. 2007.
 44 T. Christiansen, ‘A Maturing Bureaucracy? The Role of the Commission in the Policy Making 
Process’, in European Union Power and Policy-Making, ed. J. Richardson et al. (London: Routledge, 
1996): 77–95, at 79.
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adjust the enlargement policy instruments and ensure a tighter focus on areas in 
urgent need of progress, also taking into account lessons learned from the previ-
ous enlargements.45
The perceived implications for Croatia and Serbia of the changing nature of 
the enlargement process post-2004 were two-fold: conditions for accession were 
both evolving and tougher than for previous enlargements; moreover, the EU was 
less absorbent. 46 Firstly, for Croatia and Serbia, unlike the experience of previous 
enlargements, the monitoring process was stricter. This was echoed by the EU’s 
justice and security commissioner, Franco Frattini, who stated that the aspirant’s 
record on human rights, corruption, and media freedom ‘will be looked at with a 
more powerful magnifying glass’.47 Secondly, the timeframe for eventual mem-
bership was lengthened, and more staging posts established. EU membership was 
credited as being the ‘one glue’ that holds the region on the path of reform and 
stabilization; the durability of the glue was questionable.48 Stricter conditionality, 
lengthening of the timeframe for accession is made clear in the November 2005 
Enlargement strategy paper. In the strategy paper, the Commission established 
more staging posts and more steps on the path to accession. Perhaps, the EU is 
seeking better-prepared candidates – a lesson drawn from previous enlargements. 
However, in some circles, this was perceived with cynicism as a delaying tactic.49
Although cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) was very much married to integration into the EU since the 
dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, the shifting salience of the ICTY condition 
in pacing the progress of Croatia and Serbia lies in the refl exivity of the Euro-
pean Commission as well as competing preferences of the EU Member States act-
ing refl exively. The condition of ICTY cooperation represented a lesson learning 
experience for the EU. The EU was able to recognize and operationalize the fol-
lowing lessons, out of a knowledge that its efforts previously had failed to secure 
Croatia and Serbia’s full cooperation with the ICTY: it was benefi cial to deal with 
painful issues earlier in the accession process, the consistent application of con-
ditionality and monitoring matters; their transformative capacity can be increased 
by using gate-keeping at signifi cant moments in the accession process and that 
ultimately, on some issues, the prospect of joining the EU is insuffi cient to bring 
 45 European Commission, ‘Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2007–2008’, COM(2007) 
663 fi nal, Brussels, 6 Nov. 2007.
 46 E. I˙çener & D. Phinnemore, ‘Enlargement and the EU’s Absorption Capacity: “Oft-Forgotten” 
Condition or Additional Obstacle to Membership?’, Insight Turkey 8, no. 3 (2006), <www.insight-
turkey.com>; ‘The Absorption Puzzle’, The Economist, 1 Jul. 2006.
 47 ‘Suddenly, bigger is no longer better: European enlargement is affl icted with growing pains’, 
The Guardian, 1 Jul. 2005.
 48 P. Ashdown, ‘EU Must Speed Up Balkans Accession’, United Press International, 8 Mar. 
2006.
 49 Interview with offi cial from European Commission, 31 May 2006.
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transformation. In particular, the EU has learned the lesson that in order to achieve 
desired results in aspirant countries, reforms must be achieved earlier rather than 
later in the reform process. According to Grabbe, the experience of setting stan-
dards and creating monitoring mechanisms for the applicants was ‘an important 
learning process for the European Commission – with potential feedback effects 
on the existing Union’.50
The early engagement between the EU and Croatia and Serbia were elite focused 
in scope and lacked a direct impact for citizens within the countries. Therefore, for 
society in the early stages, most within Croatia and Serbia were not well informed 
about what EU membership meant for them, never mind how the process actually 
worked and the implications of stricter conditionality and benchmarking. Indeed, 
38% said they felt uninformed about Serbia’s association with the EU. Further-
more, 62% believed that the EU was constantly introducing new conditions for 
Serbia, placing it in an unfavourable situation compared to any other country.51 
When Croatia received candidacy for EU membership in April 2005, support for 
EU membership suffered a downturn, sustaining the hypothesis that the closer 
a country gets to membership, the concerns and negative impacts become more 
salient. For example, in June 2005, 47.5% expressed negative attitudes about 
Croatia becoming an EU Member State, whereas two years previously it stood 
at 75.5%.52 Indeed, according to recent Eurobarometer fi ndings, support for EU 
membership continues to wane in Croatia: in June 2007, 34% polled supported EU 
membership.53 Indeed, a 2008 poll showed that the majority of respondents, 38%, 
felt that EU membership would be a negative thing for Croatia.54 This continued 
expression of negativity regarding EU membership extends into feelings of trust 
about EU agencies and the knowledge of the work of EU integration in Croatia. 
For example, in Autumn 2009, 42% polled do not trust the EU.
An important and related determinant of the EU’s refl exivity is how the EU 
perceives the following: its policies, what impacts the effect of its policies, and the 
accuracy to what actually happens on the ground. Central here are the European 
Commission delegations, which play an instrumental role in highlighting poten-
tial pitfalls in the integration process as well as communicating the feedback and 
outcomes of EU impacts on the ground in the two cases. In both cases, the delega-
tions consisted of experienced and a sizeable number of staff, which refl ected the 
long-term salience of the two cases for the EU (which raises a question for future 
 50 Grabbe, supra n. 11, 86.
 51 Serbian European Integration Offi ce, The EU Perspective of Serbian Citizen Trends, <www.
seio.gov.rs>, December 2008.
 52 Croatian European Integration Offi ce, Attitudes toward EU Integration in Croatia, <www.
mvpei.hr/ei/default.asp?ru=219&sid=&akcija=&jezik=2>, June 2005 and June 2003.
 53 Eurobarometer, Eurobarometer 68, Public Opinion in the EU, National Report: Croatia, 
Autumn 2007.
 54 Eurobarometer, Eurobarometer 70: Public Opinion in the EU, Autumn 2009.
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research to examine the role of delegations in other confl icts where the EU’s inter-
est had not been so substantial). How the EU perceives the impacts of the chosen 
strategy is signifi cant since it has an implication on how the EU shapes its future 
engagement that ties in with the refl exivity of the EU’s actorness in the two cases. 
Having a fairly accurate or inaccurate perception of the impacts of the EU’s strat-
egy dictated the nature and impact of the EU’s policies in Croatia and Serbia. For 
instance, in both cases, the pursuit of EU conditionality over ICTY had tangible 
outcomes, for the EU, in terms of the number of indictees transferred to the ICTY 
yet, the impact on the reconciliation and confl ict transformation process was much 
less clear since compounded by the unintended impact of fostering a sentiment of 
collective guilt. The EU’s impact on confl ict transformation in Croatia and Serbia 
through the chosen strategies of integration and enlargement was affected by the 
EU’s perceptions and responses to these perceptions about the outcomes of the 
policies.
Although the various EU agencies involved in the enlargement process could 
be criticized for not fostering an inclusive process involving all parties, lessons 
have been learned and policy-makers are revising the enlargement approach evi-
denced by new and tailored mechanisms. The lesson learning has been incomplete. 
Essentially, the EU seems to have realized that the main obstacle to the impacts of 
integration and enlargement dynamics lies with the political parties, yet the EU has 
not sought to engage proactively with all political parties, particularly in Serbia. 
The EU’s transformative capacity could be improved by enhanced contact with the 
SRS combined with an increased fi eld presence in both cases that would permit the 
EU to work with and be aware of the positions of all actors rather than the parties 
at a government level. However, such reforms to the EU’s transformative capacity 
in Croatia and Serbia will be determined by the internal dynamics within the EU 
which have at times proven to be harmful to the EU’s transformative capacity.
V Conclusions
The article has shown that refl exivity has been at play within the enlargement 
approach. In DG Enlargement, focus has centred upon the refi nement of exist-
ing and the introduction of new mechanisms. This is not simply a matter of DG 
enlargement responding to negative attitudes about enlargement since 2005 within 
EU agencies, such as the Parliament and the Council, but rather it is a calculated 
refl ection based on experiential lesson learning of Rehn’s Cabinet. Frustrated by 
and reacting to the negative attitudes, to the enlargement process post-2005, the 
response of Rehn’s cabinet conformed to the predictions of the policy-learning 
model: it developed a more tailored approach to the changing internal context as 
well as the situations within candidate and future candidate countries. The frames 
applied to the recent history of the Balkans, by the European Commission, as 
well as the frames applied to the recent enlargements have infl uenced the way the 
enlargement approach has proceeded in the Balkans.
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The salience of refl exive policy-making within DG enlargement is increasingly 
paramount because of the altering effect on the way enlargement works. Previ-
ously, it had been understood and accepted that the shadow of both past and future 
enlargements dictated policy outputs regarding decisions made about integrating 
the Balkan countries into the EU enlargement process. To an extent, this continues 
to refl ect the way the current enlargement process operates, fi rmly implementing 
lessons learned from recent enlargements as well as seeking to manage the future 
accessions of the Balkan countries with fi nesse and meticulousness.
This process remains fraught due to the tensions between dealing with the polit-
ical demands internal in the EU, the intentions, abilities, and the product of trans-
formations in the cases, and the technical operation of the enlargement approach. 
These tensions complicate the delivery of the enlargement process and impact on 
the way that individuals learn. The article drew out the perceived motivations and 
impact of lesson learning using empirical data to confi rm that lesson learning is an 
ongoing part of the daily business of DG enlargement while the pressures of EU 
integration and Member State politics refl ect on the frames in which they learn. 
The evidence shown here reveals the possibility of the EU seeking to slow down 
the rate at which new Member States are admitted. The process of learning was 
paramount and it was the lessons learned from previous enlargements as well as 
experiences in the countries that embedded tighter conditionality and benchmark-
ing into the enlargement process.
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